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Confessions of a Deluded Westerner 
Michael Brent 1 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I aim to make two general points. First, I 
claim that the discussions in Repetti (Buddhist) assume dif-
ferent, sometimes conflicting, notions of free will, so the 
guiding question of the book is not as clear as it could be. 
Second, according to Buddhist tradition, the path to en-
lightenment requires rejecting the delusional belief in the 
existence of a persisting self. I claim that if there is no 
persisting self, there are no intentional actions; and, if 
there are no intentional actions, there is no hope for Bud-
dhist enlightenment. Thus, rejecting the allegedly delu-
sional belief in a persisting self has disastrous conse-
quences, both for the existence of intentional action and 
for Buddhist soteriology.  
 
1 Whither Free Will?  
In the Anglophone-analytic philosophical tradition, the concept of free 
will is rife with controversy and, at times, confusion. Some philosophers 
believe that the notion of free will concerns a special ability, a capacity 
                                               
1 Philosophy Department, University of Denver. Email: michael.brent@du.edu. 
690 Brent, Confessions of a Deluded Westerner 
 
typically described in terms of rational choice.2 Other philosophers be-
lieve that the concept of free will is about a unique kind of cause, an al-
legedly uncaused cause that operates independently of the events and 
laws of nature that comprise the ongoing history of the universe.3 Still 
others claim that the notion of free will deals with alternative possibili-
ties, distinct courses of action that could have been pursued had you act-
ed otherwise than you did.4 Indeed, there are so many ways of under-
standing the concept of free will that it might be essentially contested in 
the sense articulated by Gallie.5 Given that the concept is understood so 
variously, it is incumbent upon us to state exactly which notion of free 
will we intend to use on any given occasion.  
 Unfortunately, there are multiple, sometimes conflicting, con-
cepts of free will used throughout the discussions collected in Repetti 
(Buddhist). For example, at the outset of the book, when introducing “the 
free will puzzle,” four different ideas are brought into view: The first 
idea is that free will involves “the feeling that what we do is up to us.” 
Second, that “the action we consider free is the one we intended,” in the 
sense that “we caused it.” Third, that if the laws of nature necessitate 
what happens, so that what takes place is the inevitable consequence of 
prior conditions operating in conjunction with those laws of nature, 
“then the sense that our doings are up to us seems illusory.” Fourth, that 
if our actions “result from purely random processes . . . how can we think 
we authored them?” (Repetti Buddhist xix, original emphases)  
                                               
2 See O’Connor (Free). 
3 See Chisholm (Person), Clarke, O’Connor (Persons), and other defenders of agent-
causation.  
4 See van Inwagen, Ginet, Kane (Significance), and other incompatibilists. 
5 See also Timpe, and Vargas. 
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 Putting these ideas together, the puzzle seems to be this: assume 
that free actions must be accompanied by a particular feeling that what 
we are doing is up to us, and assume that such actions must be caused by 
us in a way that accords with what we intend to do. If our actions are the 
inevitable consequence of prior conditions operating in conjunction 
with the laws of nature, or if they are the chance result of purely random 
processes operating around or within us, then that feeling is illusory. 
But, if the feeling that what we are doing is up to us is illusory, the action 
in question is not free.  
 There are two related points worth noting here. First, the con-
cept of free will at issue is not yet clear. We are not told whether the 
feeling in question is a type of bodily sensation, or proprioceptive 
awareness of the position and movement of our limbs, or non-
observational knowledge of what we are doing, or something else. Even 
if we were provided with further information about this feeling, it is 
doubtful that acting with free will requires that you experience any par-
ticular feeling when acting in the relevant way. As a general point about 
the phenomenology of agency, whether free or otherwise, there are 
well-known illusions of bodily movement that challenge the reliability of 
our experiences when acting.6 Arguably, instead of requiring that you 
undergo any particular feeling when acting, free will requires that you 
exert a unique kind of control over the relevant action, regardless of what 
you might be feeling or experiencing at that moment in time.7  
                                               
6 See the papers collected in Roessler and Eilan, especially Marcel.  
7 For discussion of the claim that free will requires control, see O’Connor (Free), who 
says: “Our survey of several themes in philosophical accounts of free will suggests that 
a—perhaps the—root issue is that of control.” 
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 Second, while it might be true that actions performed with free 
will are appropriately8 caused and sustained by the relevant intentions 
and other rationalizing states of mind, free will requires more than this. 
Appropriately causing and sustaining your own actions in ways that ac-
cord with your intentions is typically assumed to be a minimal require-
ment on intentional action, but not free will.9 Since the origin of the rel-
evant intention might be another agent, as in cases of acting under 
threat or coercion, acting in accordance with an intention does not en-
sure that you are acting with free will. Again, arguably, free will requires 
that you wield a particular form of control over the relevant action, re-
gardless of whether the action accords with the relevant intentions or 
other rationalizing states of mind.  
 Indeed, in the recent Anglophone-analytic philosophical tradi-
tion, having free will requires a robust kind of control over the relevant 
intentional action. This kind of control has been understood in at least 
one of two ways.10 On the one hand, control has been described in terms 
of alternative possibilities. On this notion, to act with free will there must 
exist genuinely open alternative possibilities at the time you perform the 
action in question, and when you perform that action it must be that you 
could have done otherwise than you in fact did. Here, it is not merely that 
you brought about your action in such a way that it accords with your 
intentions, or that its performance is accompanied by the feeling of it 
being up to you. Satisfying these conditions would suggest that your ac-
tion is intentional. Given this modal or counterfactual notion of control, 
satisfying these conditions would not suggest that you could have done 
                                               
8 The qualification “appropriately” is used to rule out cases of deviant causation. For a 
famous case of deviance, see Davidson (Freedom).  
9 See Bishop, Brand, Bratman, Davidson (Action), Enç, Goldman, and Mele (Springs) for 
such an account of intentional action. 
10 For helpful discussion of these two alternatives, see Timpe.  
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otherwise than you did, so it would not suggest that you acted with free 
will.  
 This notion of control is controversial, in part because the exist-
ence of genuinely open alternative possibilities seems to require the as-
sumption that the universe is indeterministic. If the universe is indeter-
ministic, then whatever happens is not determined by antecedent condi-
tions and the laws of nature. If so, it would seem to be a matter of luck 
whether or not you perform any particular intentional action, and this 
would seem to undermine the sense in which you are controlling its oc-
currence.11 In light of such controversy, another robust notion of control 
has been described in terms of sourcehood. Here, to have free will at the 
time you perform the relevant intentional action you must be the prima-
ry source of its occurrence. It is not that you could have done otherwise, 
or that you brought about your action so that it accords with your inten-
tions, or that its performance is accompanied by the feeling of it being 
up to you. Rather, being the ultimate source of the relevant action re-
quires that you cause its occurrence in a specific way, so that your action 
originates with and is controlled by you, rather than with events or con-
ditions that you do not control. When you are the ultimate source, you 
play a necessary causal role in the production of your action, a contribu-
tion that cannot be traced back to causally sufficient events or condi-
tions that exist independently of you and which you do not control.12 
 Now, if we compare the notion of free will that requires either 
form of robust control to “the free will puzzle” (Repetti Buddhist xix) in-
troduced at the outset of the book and to the various notions of free will 
used in several of its chapters, we will see that there are different, some-
times conflicting, concepts employed throughout. This is problematic, 
                                               
11 See Clarke, Mele (Autonomous; Free), Pereboom (Living), and van Inwagen.  
12 See Pereboom (Free). 
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because it renders ambiguous the question that guides the book, wheth-
er there are Buddhist perspectives on free will, and makes the answers 
dependent upon the particular notion(s) of free will, if any, assumed by 
each author, rather than something more generally applicable.  
 For instance, Meyers (182-192) draws a distinction between two 
concepts. First, what she refers to as empirical freedom of action, “the 
fact that human beings appear to have some degree of choice and control 
with respect to their external actions” (182, her emphasis). Second, what 
she calls empirical free will, “the fact that human beings appear to have 
some degree of choice and control with respect to . . . their internal men-
tal states” (182, her emphasis). Notice that what Meyers describes here is 
not a feeling that the relevant action is up to you, nor the claim that the 
action must accord with what you intend to do, so this is not the notion 
of free will that figures in the puzzle that frames the book. Moreover, 
having some degree of choice and control over your bodily actions and 
internal mental states is a plausible requirement on performing an ac-
tion intentionally. But, arguably, in order for an intentional action to be 
free, the kind of control that you wield over its occurrence must be suffi-
ciently robust in either of the two ways noted above. 
 Repetti (Agentless 193-206) seems to employ yet a different notion 
of free will. He refers to “a heightened form of self-regulative ability,” 
which he describes as the “ability to detect, discern, and disengage from 
the volitional impetus of any mental state,” and “choose whether or not 
to act on [that mental state or the relevant component]” (196). The prob-
lem, though, is that however heightened this ability might be, unless you 
control its exercise in either of the robust ways noted above, using this 
self-regulative ability intentionally does not imply that you could have 
done otherwise, or that you were the ultimate source of the relevant ac-
tion. Unless the sort of control that you have when exercising this self-
regulative ability satisfies either of these more robust requirements, it 
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does not matter how sophisticated this ability might be: its exercise will 
not yet be free. Similarly, for Harvey (158-169) the issue of free will con-
cerns “our ability for self-direction” through which we “have a degree of 
freedom” that can be cultivated by following the Buddha’s teachings 
(161). Here, too, what Harvey describes in terms of self-direction is not 
yet a notion of free will. Without ensuring that the kind of control that 
you wield over your capacity for directing your bodily actions and 
thoughts is robust in either of the above ways, we do not yet have in 
view a notion of free will. Likewise, according to Gowans (11-21),  
Buddha thought that human beings were capable of re-
flecting on and understanding his teaching, accepting it 
on this basis, forming intentions to carry it out, and acting 
on these intentions . . . . When it is said that the Buddha 
accepted a notion of free will, perhaps this is all that is 
meant. (18)  
Perhaps, but this does not yet describe conditions under which an action 
is performed with free will. The reason is that being capable of reflecting 
on and understanding the relevant teachings, and accepting and intend-
ing to act on those teachings, can occur in the absence of either form of 
robust control noted above. So, what Meyers, Repetti, Harvey, and Gow-
ans here describe are not notions of free will, but conditions under 
which an action is performed intentionally.  
 Compare these notions of free will to Garfield (45-58) and Flana-
gan (59-71), who assume that free will requires agent causation. As Gar-
field (45) puts it, free will requires “uncaused agent causation,” which, as 
noted below, is not correct. He thinks that:  
motivations for most modern thought on free will are 
twofold. The first is metaphysical—to understand agency 
and personhood, and the distinction between what we do 
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and what happens. The second—closely connected—is 
ethical and legal. We distinguish between actions for 
which we are responsible and events for which, though 
we may be causally implicated, we are not responsible 
(46).  
Notice that the distinction between what we do and what happens, and 
between actions for which we are responsible and events for which we 
are not, are different in kind. The first concerns the difference between 
actions that we perform intentionally and actions that merely happen, 
such as the distinction between stepping on my foot on purpose and ac-
cidentally doing so because the subway unexpectedly jostled you in my 
direction. Intuitively, although both are actions that you have performed 
and things that you have done, only the former is an expression of your 
agency, because only the former is something you do intentionally.  
 Crucially, it is a further question, addressed by the second distinc-
tion, whether you are responsible for your intentional actions. That dis-
tinction concerns the difference between intentional actions that are 
free and those that are not. This distinction arises within the category of 
intentional actions, and is about identifying just those intentional ac-
tions that are free. To illustrate, consider a scenario that Garfield men-
tions, in which he is threatened into jumping out a window to his un-
timely death. He says, “Plausibly, I jump freely” but “I did not freely 
commit suicide” (47). This does not seem to be the correct analysis of 
what is happening. Arguably, because of the threat, there is no sense in 
which jumping out the window is free. Because of the threat, he could 
not have done otherwise than he did, and he was not the ultimate source 
of his action, as someone else made him jump. Thus, Garfield does not 
control that action in either of the robust ways that seem to be required 
for free will. Nevertheless, his jumping out the window is intentional: he 
is not pushed out the window, he does not accidentally slip and fall to his 
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death, and he knows exactly what he is doing. He jumped on purpose, 
with a specific goal in mind, but, tragically, he was not free in doing so. 
When assuming that jumping out the window is free and causing his own 
death is not, it seems that Garfield conflates free action and intentional 
action.  
 Flanagan (59-71) also assumes that the notion of free will “re-
quires agent causation,” which itself is “a bad idea that never stops giv-
ing” (60). This is not correct. There are accounts of free will that do not 
require agent causation. For instance, some libertarians and compatibil-
ists alike affirm the existence of free will without assuming any notion of 
agent causation.13 Moreover, there are accounts of agent causation that 
do not require the existence of what Chisholm notoriously called “a 
prime mover unmoved,” or an uncaused cause (Human 12).14 Indeed, the 
notion of agent causation concerns only the relata of the causal relation. 
By itself, it requires only that agents, understood as particular kinds of 
objects, are capable of causing effects. I return to the notion of agent 
causation below. 
 Last, but not least, when introducing two notions of free will that 
philosophers working in the Anglophone-analytic tradition have dis-
cussed, Friquegnon first says that “actions to be free must be intentional 
and avoidable,” where avoidable means “that if one chose to do X at time 
T1, if one then ‘rolled back the clock’ one could, all things being the 
same, choose to do Y at T1 instead, X and Y being two different courses 
of action” (107). This is one way of stating the modal or counterfactual 
                                               
13 For the former, see Wiggins, Ekstrom (Free; Toward), and Kane (Significance; Free). For 
the latter, see Fischer, Fischer and Ravizza, Frankfurt, Haji, Mele (Autonomous), and Wal-
lace. 
14 Historically, defenders of agent causation have assumed that when the agent acts 
with free will they are an “uncaused cause” of the relevant action, but this is not a nec-
essary feature of the view. See Brent, Markosian, and Nelkin for alternatives. 
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notion of control required for free will. Next, she provides another no-
tion of free will, which drops the modal notion of control and instead 
says that “a free act is an action that is caused by a rational intention” 
(107). As Friquegnon correctly recognizes, this second notion is prob-
lematic because without the modal or counterfactual requirement, “it 
implies that no events, strictly speaking, could have turned out differ-
ently” (107). Curiously, when discussing the notion of free will as it fig-
ures in the Buddhist tradition, Friquegnon says that on “the most basic 
level, free action is conceived of as the absence of external constraint” 
(109). Unfortunately, an absence of external constraint does not ensure 
that at the moment in time when you acted, you could have done other-
wise, or were the ultimate source of your action. That is, while an ab-
sence of external constraint might ensure that your action is intentional, 
it does not guarantee that you controlled your action in either of the ro-
bust ways that, arguably, are required for free will. If so, then whatever 
the Buddhist tradition might be said to threaten, it is not yet clear that it 
threatens a notion of free will.  
 
2. No Self? No Action 
In this second section, I argue that a core aspect of the Buddhist tradi-
tion does threaten something that is valued quite dearly, and this is the 
second general point that I would like to make. I suggest that the no-self 
theory found in Buddhist texts does not threaten the possibility of free 
will. It threatens more than free will. Worse, if there is no persisting self, 
this would undermine the possibility of intentional action per se. For 
without a persisting self who initiates, sustains, and controls the action 
in question, there is no intentional action in the first place. Thus, we 
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might say that in the absence of a persisting self, there is no agency at 
all, free or otherwise.15  
 Before elaborating this claim, we should make two preliminary 
clarifications. First, it is worth noting that philosophers working in the 
Anglophone-analytic tradition use the terms “agent,” “self,” “person,” 
and “soul” in a variety of different ways. Here, I assume that “self” and 
“agent” are synonymous, and refer to you as the kind of entity that you 
fundamentally are. I do not use “person” because of its connection to 
legal contexts, e.g., questions of rights and protections, and I do not use 
“soul” because of its connection to the beliefs and practices of particular 
faith groups, e.g., Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, or Islam.  
 Second, we should say something about the Buddhist no-self the-
ory as it is articulated in the various chapters of Repetti (Buddhist). In 
particular, we should identify the ostensibly problematic notion of self 
that Buddhists claim is delusional, and we should distinguish the Bud-
dhist notion of self that is offered in its place. Historically, the Buddhist 
no-self theory can be understood as a response to the Brahmanical pos-
tulation of an eternal, unchanging, and non-physical self.16 On Gowans’s 
way of describing the allegedly problematic notion, the key to Buddhist 
enlightenment is the realization that there “is no distinct and unchang-
ing self over and above [your mental events], or somehow at the center 
holding all of [your mental events] together” (19). Likewise, as Strawson 
describes it, for the Buddhist, “there’s no such thing as the persisting 
individual self” (81). As Abelson puts it, “there is no persisting essence of 
                                               
15 For a similar claim about conditions under which agency is impossible, see Steward. 
16 Nearly every Hindu system of belief and practice is committed to the existence of a 
self, typically understood to be non-physical, unchanging, and eternally existing. How-
ever, as Ram-Prasad illustrates, the situation is more complex than this. Different Hin-
du systems adhere to different accounts of the self, some of which (e.g., classical 
Advaita Vedānta) do not assume it is a non-physical substance.  
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any individual, no substantial ‘I’ standing beneath or behind an individu-
al’s constantly arising and perishing parts and properties” (148). And, 
according to Siderits, the belief that mental events, such as perceptions, 
desires, intentions, etc., “must have an owner arises from the fact that 
we have conceptually constructed a substance, the mind, which holds a 
bundle of such tropes together” (137).17 
 It is not obvious that these remarks describe a single notion of an 
agent. The metaphorical language makes it challenging to interpret phil-
osophically, but two ideas seem to be at issue. First, to say that as an 
agent you exist “beneath,” “behind,” “over and above,” or “at the cen-
ter” of your perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and other mental 
events is a way of saying that you are not identical with those mental 
events, either individually or collectively.18 The idea seems to be that 
while your perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and other mental 
events come and go, changing over time, as an agent you exist in a way 
that differs from your fluctuating mental events. A useful metaphor 
could be that while the roof and gutters of your house are replaced and 
hence change over time, your house continues to exist throughout this 
process. Your house is numerically one and the same entity throughout, 
in the sense that although some of its material parts have changed, the 
house itself has not.19 Before, during, and after the change in such parts, 
                                               
17 Tropes are particularized, i.e., non-repeatable, features of objects, such as the specific 
shade of red had by my particular hockey jersey. See Heil for useful discussion.  
18 Although I will not here phrase it in terms of your body and its parts, the point about 
non-identity is applicable to both the mental and the physical domains.  
19 It does not follow that the house itself cannot be changed. Rather, what is denied is 
that the relation between the house and its parts must be one of material constitution, 
where constitution is identity and the house just is (identical to) the parts of which it is 
composed. See Paul and Varzi for helpful discussion.  
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the formal features or relations that make your house the specific kind 
of object that it is remain unmodified.20 Call this the claim of Non-Identity. 
 The second underlying idea seems to be this. To say that as an 
agent you are a “persisting individual,” that is, a “substantial” “essence” 
that “holds together” and “owns” your mental events, is a way of saying 
that you are numerically one entity whose existence provides the consti-
tutive conditions for your perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and 
other mental events.21 The idea seems to be that those mental events are 
yours rather than mine because they are features of you rather than me. 
Here, a helpful metaphor could be that this specific roof and gutter are 
located precisely where they are rather than atop another structure, and 
have the unique appearance, texture, layout, etc., that they do, because 
they are part of your house rather than mine. Your house provides the 
constitutive conditions for this roof and gutter being what they are, 
making them the particular roof and gutters that they are, i.e., features 
of your house.22 Call this the claim of Constitution.  
 Now, neither Non-Identity nor Constitution require controversial 
metaphysical assumptions. Thinking of the agent in these ways emphati-
cally does not require that we accept an Abrahamic notion of the agent 
as an eternally existing, non-physical soul, or a Brahmanical notion of an 
eternal, unchanging, and non-physical self, or Cartesian mind-body in-
teractionist dualism. One can reject such assumptions while accepting 
                                               
20 For present purposes, I remain neutral about the precise status of the relevant formal 
features and relations, so long as they are not material (i.e., composed of matter). For 
useful discussion in the context of Medieval philosophy, see Cross.  
21 See note 18 above: the point about constitutive conditions is applicable to the mental 
and physical domains.  
22 Again, for present purposes, I remain neutral about the precise status of the relevant 
constitutive conditions, so long as they are not material (i.e., composed of matter). For 
useful discussion of related issues in the context of Medieval philosophy, see Cross.  
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that as an agent, you are not identical with any of your mental events, 
and that you provide the constitutive conditions for your mental events, 
making them yours rather than someone else’s. To accept Non-Identity is 
to claim that you persist through time in a manner that differs from your 
mental events. Such persistence does not require that you exist eternal-
ly, permanently, or unchangingly. Likewise, Constitution claims that your 
mental events are attributes of your mental life, not mine. Providing 
these constitutive conditions does not require that you exist as a simple, 
indivisible, eternal substance. Rather, I suggest that you persist as a par-
ticular kind of living animal, viz., as a human being.23 As such, you un-
dergo the relevant mental events as conscious subject, have numerous 
physical parts and properties, exist for a finite duration of time, endure 
numerous kinds of change without annihilation, stand in a variety of re-
lations with other objects, and initiate, sustain, and control your inten-
tional actions.24 I return to this below.  
 In place of the allegedly delusional notion of the persisting self, 
the Buddhist account of the self suggests that we are, as Gowans de-
scribes us, merely an “ensemble of ever-changing and causally depend-
ent processes” (19). We are, as Abelson depicts us, “only a series of dis-
tinct, momentary collections of psychophysical constituents” (148), that 
is, a bundle of the five aggregates of physical form, feeling or sensation, 
cognition or perception, mental formations or volition, and conscious-
ness that figure in Buddhist ontology. According to Siderits, the claim 
that human beings are enduring substances is a merely conventional 
truth that depends on the beliefs and practices of human beings, which 
are ultimately tropes, i.e., “particular momentary occurrences” (137). 
Harvey argues that for Buddhists, when we hold another agent responsi-
                                               
23 For a similar claim about our status as human beings, see Ismael. 
24 Note that the control at issue here is not the robust kind of control required for free 
will. See Shepherd for an account of control over intentional action.  
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ble for performing an action, this does “not imply that such a past action 
was done by a substantial, still-existent Self, but only that it was done by 
an earlier portion of the stream-of-states that the person now is, rather 
than any other stream-of-states” (159). That is,  
actions are done by the kind-of-person-one-has-been-so 
far, but this is ‘permanent’ only in an approximate sense, 
as a cluster of mental and physical process-events with a 
reasonably consistent, but still changeable, pattern to it. 
This is the only kind of ‘thing’ that can be an agent of ac-
tion. (Harvey 160)  
 Again, the metaphorical language makes it challenging to inter-
pret philosophically, but the underlying idea seems to be this. For the 
Buddhist, as an agent you are a “stream,” “series,” “ensemble,” “bundle,” 
or “cluster” of physical form, feeling or sensation, cognition or percep-
tion, mental formations or volition, and consciousness, i.e., the five ag-
gregates of Buddhist ontology. At any given moment in time and loca-
tion in space, you are an aggregate-involving event. Across space and 
time, you exist as a succession of such events that stand in the appropri-
ate relations to each other.25 But, herein lies a problem, which is the sec-
ond general point that I would like to make. Within a Buddhist ontology 
that assumes that successions of aggregate-involving events comprise 
you as an agent, the cause of your intentional actions would have to be 
                                               
25 Though I will not pursue the point here, I want to register a potential worry about the 
claim that you are nothing but a succession of aggregate-involving events extended 
over time, e.g., a “stream-of-states.” If so, in virtue of what fact is this stream-of-states 
identical to you, and that stream-of-states identical to me? And, in virtue of what fact is 
this stream-of-states identical to you now, and that stream-of-states identical to you at 
a different moment in time? It is not obvious that we can answer these questions while 
remaining faithful to a Buddhist ontology comprised of all and only aggregate-
involving events.  
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one or more of these aggregate-involving events. Assume that among 
the five aggregates the cause of your intentional actions is a particular 
volition, such as an intention to perform the relevant action. Volitions 
are mental events the occurrence of which appropriately causes and sus-
tains the corresponding movement of your body, which is yet another 
event. Crucially, your volitional formations and other mental events are 
not something the occurrence of which you, or anything else, are con-
trolling. Your mental events are the effect of the occurrence of prior 
events over which you equally exert no control. If that is the case, then 
all that exists are sequences of events taking place as the consequence of 
prior sequences of events, ad infinitum, and nothing is controlling what is 
happening. But, if nothing is controlling what is happening, then there 
can be no intentional actions, for intentional actions are precisely those 
episodes in your life that you control. Hence, intentional action is impos-
sible where only aggregate-involving events exist and causally interact 
with other such events, and nothing is controlling what takes place.26 
 Goodman comes close to recognizing this point, when he says 
that because “there is no basic, irreducible self,” it follows that “we are 
not responsible [for our actions] in any way that would generate basic 
desert” (36). Instead, he says, for Buddhists, “there is no sense of being a 
person who acts; rather, actions emerge through spontaneous responsiveness” 
(38, emphasis added). The point about the absence of moral responsibil-
ity can be made without assuming that as an agent you are “basic” and 
“irreducible.” Rather, so long as there exists all and only aggregate-
involving events causing other such events, pace Goodman, what emerg-
es though spontaneous responsiveness cannot be intentional action. 
                                               
26 Note that this claim does not require that causation is deterministic. Rather, if all that 
exists are events standing in causal relation with other events and nobody (i.e., no 
agent) is controlling anything, the claim is that there can be no intentional actions, 
which are paradigmatic instances of things we control.  
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Spontaneous responses are no doubt things that we do, like jolting in re-
action to an unexpected loud noise. But, importantly, such responses are 
not intentional actions: they are not things that we control on purpose, 
with a goal in mind, for a reason, knowingly as such, etc. As a result, giv-
en the Buddhist ontology, there is no intentional action.  
 I suggest that intentional action requires the existence of a par-
ticular agent that persists through time in a way that differs from their 
mental and bodily events, and that initiates, sustains, and controls the 
relevant actions. This is not a suggestion that can be fully defended here, 
but the core idea can be stated rather simply.27 The idea is that inten-
tional action requires agent causation. Crucially, this does not imply that 
particular agents are non-physical, eternal, changeless substances, 
something that could exist entirely independently of their various bodily 
parts, physical attributes, and mental events. Equally as crucial, this does 
not imply that when an agent is performing the relevant action, she 
must act as an uncaused cause, distinct from the events and laws of na-
ture that comprise the ongoing history of the universe, nor that causa-
tion is indeterministic. This requires only that agents are persisting 
kinds of objects that are not identical with any of their mental or bodily 
events, considered individually or collectively, and that initiate, sustain, 
and control the intentional actions that they perform. 
 On a Buddhist ontology where agents exist as nothing but collec-
tions of the five aggregates, nobody is doing anything, intentionally or 
otherwise. Mental and bodily events are taking place and causally inter-
acting in appropriate ways, but because there are no persisting objects, 
there are no agents moving their bodies and controlling their states of 
mind intentionally, i.e., on purpose, with a goal in mind, knowingly as 
such, etc. Thus, before we are in a position to decide whether Buddhism 
                                               
27 See Brent for elaboration and defence.  
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threatens free will, we must explain how it is that agents are capable of 
performing such intentional actions in the first place, given this ontolo-
gy. If the claim made above is correct, a Buddhist ontology renders this 
explanatory task unlikely to succeed. Worse, if this ontology undermines 
the existence of intentional action, then intentionally embarking upon 
the path to enlightenment with the aim of achieving the soteriological 
goals of Buddhist practice is not possible. To many Buddhists, this should 
be quite troubling. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Arguably, our world would be drastically improved if human suffering 
were reduced or altogether eliminated. Buddhism offers a path towards 
the elimination of suffering. An essential step along that path is the re-
jection of a deeply held belief that many people find habitual and even 
inescapable. The belief in question concerns the existence of oneself as a 
particular, enduring agent. More specifically, it concerns the existence of 
a persisting agent that is distinct from its physical body and its continu-
ously changing states of mind. As part of the path towards the eradica-
tion of suffering, Buddhism rejects this belief as delusional. By discarding 
this delusional belief, the thought is, we can learn how to let go of vari-
ous forms of attachment that lead to suffering, and thus improve our 
well-being.  
 Using the texts collected in Repetti (Buddhist) as my foil, I have 
claimed that accepting a Buddhist ontology in place of the belief in a 
persisting agent undermines the possibility of intentional action. In an 
ontology where all that exists are aggregate-involving events standing in 
the relevant causal relations to each other, there is no place for inten-
tional action. Events happen, but nothing controls what takes place. This 
is especially worrisome given the pivotal role of intentional mental ac-
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tion within Buddhist practices. For such practices involve learning how 
to control your conscious mental life in order to cultivate peace and 
tranquility. By learning how to control your reactions to external stimuli 
and developing introspective awareness, you learn to regulate your own 
cognitive processes and become more focused and concentrated. Argua-
bly, such practices are, or constitutively involve, intentional mental ac-
tions that you perform with a specific goal in mind.28 Thus, those who 
endorse a Buddhist ontology must provide an account of intentional ac-
tion that coheres with their austere ontological commitments, and that 
explains how such practices are possible in the first place. Only then can 
we inquire whether Buddhism might threaten free will. 
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